Against Ayn Rand, Vol. 4: Atheism, Materialism, Determinism, and Society

Society has long been a topic of discussion among the intelligentsia of all civilizations. It has different meanings for some cultures than for others, and its meaning is frequently hotly contested by people of different ideological persuasions. The meaning of society is essential because in democratic countries, the expectation is that the government act in the best interest of that society. And in order to define what is in the best interests of the society, there must be an understanding of what is meant by the term society.

In "The Objectivist Ethics," Ayn Rand makes passing reference to her vision of society. Tucked away in an appositive, which special attention is required to notice, Rand notes that "society is only a number of individual men." While Rand is right to point out that society is the product of men (we'll assume she's referring to all human beings), she has missed the other half of the equation entirely. Society and individual human beings are mutually constituted. Humans make up society, and society creates individuals.

It's especially strange that Rand should overlook so completely an idea such as social constructivism, given her rejection of all mysticism and the supernatural. If individuals are not the product of God or some other supernatural power, and they are not the product of their society, there seems to be no other argument but that the individual produces herself. This is, of course, impossible, and even the most serious individualists of the 19th century such as Emerson and Thoreau would not have made such an argument. It is impossible to be uninfluenced, unaltered, and entirely independent of society, even in the practice of becoming a hermit. In fact, one would be influenced by society to reject it in that instance.

But perhaps I am being disingenuous. Perhaps Rand is not arguing that we are uninfluenced, but is instead arguing that society is a non-entity, that we are only influenced by other individuals. Even this idea, however, seems to place too much emphasis on individuals. Societal norms come into and go out of fashion. Whereas today democracy is seen as a good tool of political organization, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, most American leaders felt that the American people could not be trusted with democracy. Michel Foucault, in his wonderful work Discipline and Punish, has described how norms of punishment have changed from the punishing of the body to the punishing of the soul. To say that society values something is not to say that a majority of individuals in a particular community believe something, but rather that a particular value is important to the coexistence of the members of that community.

This is where the idea of intersubjectivity must make its appearance. Rand neglects entirely the notion that there is anything beyond the physical, material, chemical/biological world. This, of course, leads her to a militant atheism. But while some would see this type of materialism and atheism as necessary corollaries and use such an argument to condemn atheists, atheism is much broader term than her narrow interpretation here. In fact, many atheists (and theists) in the social sciences, argue for the idea of intersubjectivity - that inherent in the interaction between two or more individuals there emerges something that is the union of subjectivity and objectivity. In a spiritual humanist (and perhaps atheist) sense, this might manifest itself as the electric chain of humanity.

But returning to Rand, supposing her strict atheist, materialist vision of the world were accurate, the world would be determined. There seems to alternative. If the world is entirely physical, then our perception of acting of our own volition would be illusory; we would only be acting of what we thought was our own volition but was instead a series of neural connections predetermined to respond in a certain way to our present situation. And if this were the case, then the entire goal of creating a society in which people have the maximum amount of freedom would instead be the goal of creating illusory freedom, the mere perception of freedom. Being an atheistic pragmatist and not entirely sure of the answer to the materialist question myself, I could be persuaded that the illusion of freedom is worth fighting for, but to Rand who is so dedicated to the pursuit of the objective truth, the idea that so many people could live under the false pretense of free will would seem to be a deal-breaker.

How can Rand advocate that objective truth achieved through the use of reason and one's own self interest be the goal on the one hand, when the pursuit of objective truth, the degree to which it is pursued, and the veracity of the ideas obtained are predetermined for the individual in the first place, especially when the individual doing the pursuing believes himself to be acting of his own volition? It makes no sense.

I am not the first to criticize Rand on these metaphysical grounds, nor, I'm sure will I be the last. Rand's metaphysics is weak at best, and I am not well-enough versed to bring it down on its head entirely, but this should be a good start. In a following post, I will tackle the fallacy of pure objectivity.

Against Ayn Rand, Vol. 3: Introversion, Shyness, and the Transmission and Production of Knowledge and Information

A couple of days ago, I wrote about the problem of non-competitive (cooperative) people in a competitive society (capitalist system). The post was speculative and did not provide any concrete thoughts on how this might manifest itself. There was, however, a fascinating piece that came out in the Sunday Review section of the NY Times about shyness and introversion that seems directly related to the previous discussion.

Susan Cain posits that shyness could actually be naturally selected for, an evolutionary advantage so to speak, but only when balanced by a greater natural selection for extroversion. Cain's argument is that the over-prescription of drugs to treat social anxiety disorder could be a detriment to the advancement of the human species. Because introverts provide a different style of leadership, and are often at the vanguard of art and science, it's necessary that society not exclude them systematically, whether that system be natural or prescribed.

Unfortunately, writes Cain, "Shyness and introversion share an undervalued status in a world that prizes extroversion... As a society, we prefer action to contemplation, risk-taking to heed-taking, certainty to doubt. Studies show that we rank fast and frequent talkers as more competent, likable, and even smarter than slow ones."

Such research is not new. Over eight years ago now, Jonathan Rauch published a piece on introversion in the Atlantic Monthly. The piece read as a coming out: "My name is Jonathan, and I am an introvert." Rauch had much the same thing to say about introverts' role in the world. "Introverts may be common, but they are also among the most misunderstood and aggrieved groups in America, possibly the world."

Yet in spite of the misperceptions about introverts, they possess above average intelligence, and are often good at a different set of skills than extroverts. Nevertheless society deems them, all other things being equal, to be not quite as good as their extroverted counterparts.

In a competitive environment in which one has to compete against others for attention, introverts are at even more of a disadvantage. They feel awkward in social groups, and are exhausted by being around other people. And introverts are clearly underrepresented in politics because of the generally outgoing nature required for a political campaign. In essence, in all public life, where sociality and extroversion are advantages, introverts are marginalized.

So what would Ayn Rand say. It is my guess that, given introverts' advantages in some capacities and generally higher than average intelligence, Rand would suggest that the public sphere is misguided for not rewarding introversion more. In fact, employers who don't value introversion are unnecessarily harming themselves by failing to devise a system that takes such a character trait into account. And she would not be wrong.

But there's a flip side to Rand's answer that is unaccounted for in her writing. What if you don't know what you don't know - the infamous unknown unknowns of Donald Rumsfeld. What if society has no idea that it is systematically oppressing a minority of people? What if society doesn't know that by altering its norms and increasing its understanding about an issue it has never thought about, it could produce better, more efficient results? What if we live in a constant state of societal anosognosia?

Even if one person, say Susan Cain or Jonathan Rauch, were to uncover the truth - that it would be better for society to account for its current norms that disadvantage introverts - it would be advantageous to such people to keep that information secret. And it is in this area - the transmission and production of knowledge and information - that Rand's philosophy breaks down. Rand argues that society is at its most efficient when each pursues her individual interests, but here we have a case where this is simply false. By pursuing one's own interests in matters of information, one can actually disadvantage society as a whole.

Again, I have not attempted to attack Rand's philosophy head on here. That will come. But I did want to highlight these articles about introversion and shyness. They are wonderful. If you like the article by Rauch, there is a follow-up here and an interview with him here.

Against Ayn Rand, Vol. 2: European Freedom

Two articles today about Europe merit further consideration, especially in the context of Randian thought. The first describes a Swedish preschool that is attempting to avoid instilling in its students any sets of gender norms. The second discusses European cities' increasingly anti-car urban planning. Both scenarios present something of an attack to Randian values of freedom. While the freedom expressed in each is not precisely European, and the use of such a term is an overgeneralization, it is clear that a different type of freedom is at play in these two examples than is at play in the writings of Ayn Rand.

At the Swedish preschool, instructors use a nascent word borne from feminist circles that is a gender-neutral pronoun when they prefer to visitors to the class, such as plumbers, nurses, mechanics, firefighters, etc. when they don't know the gender of that person. They also use children's stories that describe families with single parents, gay or lesbian parents, three or four parents, and other unorthodox family structures. The idea is to make everyone comfortable with the idea that different family structures aren't necessarily bad family structures, and that different gender roles aren't necessarily bad gender roles.

The criticism, while well-intentioned, is oftentimes misguided. One Swedish woman suggests that "Different gender roles aren't problematic as long as they are equally valued." One can't help but be reminded of the famous US Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education in which the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that separate is inherently unequal.

Another criticism came from an American child psychologist quoted in the story, who argues that "Gender neutrality at its worst is emasculating maleness." His jumbled lexicon makes his meaning somewhat unclear, but he would be wrong to suggest that it will be bad for men to like masculine things. Boys aren't taught that it is wrong to play sports. Rather, they are taught that it is not wrong to like to cook or sew or wear pink.

The dismantling of gender norms is not designed to be constricting; in fact, it's designed to be liberating. There is that which we call masculine and that which we call feminine. Whether one is male-bodied or female-bodied should have no bearing on that person's choice of how masculine and how feminine to be because the association of certain behavioral norms with certain genitalia is nothing more than a constricting social construction.

The other story pertaining to European freedom focused on city planning in many cities that is making it more difficult to use cars. Trolleys are given the power to change traffic lights, parking spaces are being removed, low-emissions zones are being implemented, bike lanes and pedestrianized zones are becoming more common, and some cities have even instituted fees to take a car into the very center of the city. All of this amounts to a substantial incentive to find others means of transportation.

The reasons are many. The environmental benefit is among the most touted, and it is likely the most substantial. But there will also be a personal health benefit as more people walk or take a bicycle. Getting more people to use public transportation is good for cities as well because it brings people from different walks of life in contact with on another, thereby creating a more coherent idea of community in the city's citizenry.

In both of these scenarios, the Swedish preschool and the driving restrictions, the goal is a certain type of freedom. While the Randian will argue that freedom is only freedom from coercion, the European city planners and Swedish preschool instructors would argue that freedom is having the best of all possible knowledge to choose from amongst the many different options some of which you might of thought did not exist previously.

This is quite easy to see in the Swedish preschool. If little boys don't know that it is acceptable for them to wear a dress or like to cook, and if little girls do not know that it is acceptable for them to pretend to be knights or like to play sports, they are not free to make rational choices regarding these opportunities. Gender norms are constricting for both men and women in this regard, and their abolishment leads to a freer society.

The example of encouraging public and non-motorized transportation in European cities is designed to help people realize the true cost of private motorized transportation. There is both an environmental and a social cost that is not factored into the use of one's private vehicle. By implementing fees and making it more difficult to drive in city centers, local governments have helped their residents experience these costs. In essence, they fill out what had gone unnoticed about the imbalance of the driving equation: social and environmental costs. When people experience these costs through different means, their cost-benefit analysis of the choice of transportation changes. More information frees them to make better choices.

In both articles, then, we see how Rand's conception of freedom is far from comprehensive. When people do not correctly experience costs and benefits, when people do not know the choices that are available to them, they are not free. Both exercises, non-normative gender education and disincentivized transportation by car, result in a freer populace.

Against Ayn Rand, Vol. 1: Healtchare

Having just concluded reading a pair of essays by Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics" and "The Nature of Government," I will begin tonight a series of posts that seek to present problems with the thinking of Rand presented in these essays. While at times I confront Rand at her own game, arguing against her from within her own framework, at other times I argue against the framework as a whole. At neither time should the choice to argue from one perspective or the other be an indication that I concede any point articulated by Rand. At times, these posts are designed explicitly to argue against Rand. At other times, such as this one, the post is peripherally related.

At a very simplistic level, the economic theory espoused by Rand is a hard-core libertarianism. Privatize, privatize, privatize is the theory of choice - an extreme laissez-faire capitalism that has complete separation of economics and government. It is my belief that the issue of medical care is enough to persuade many people that such a scenario does not work. Unless you believe that those people who cannot afford medical care should not receive it, it is unlikely that you would consent to Rand's position being superior to one in which the government is involved.

If health insurance were entirely left up to the free market, there would be many people who could not afford to purchase it for themselves. These people would, therefore, be denied coverage. The case of the person who has survived multiple heart attacks is a good example. The preexisting condition of heart instability would mean that the cost of insuring such a person would be quite high. So let's suppose that this person does not have the money to purchase a health insurance plan that will cover him in the event of another heart attack. Well, the chances are that he'll have another heart attack, so let's suppose that he does. He is rushed to the emergency room where doctors are obligated by their code of ethics to help in whatever way they can. The medical bill may well reach six figures, but of course, the man has no insurance because he can't afford it, so there is no way he can pay the medical bill.

There seem to be four options here. 1) The medical field could rewrite its code of ethics so that they are not obligated to help patients who cannot pay. 2) Hospitals raise prices for everything to offset the cost of treating those patients who can't afford it. 3) The government could reimburse the hospital for the emergency cost. 4) The government could ensure that the everyone has health insurance, either by mandating that health insurance providers cover everyone or by running the system itself. If you find option one unpalatable, as I do, then the Randian system is unacceptable. As for the second option, it drives the price of health insurance up even higher, meaning even more people can't afford it. This is, more or less, how the system has worked for some time now, and it has proven to be radically inefficient.

Regardless of which scenario other than the first we are examining, the Randian will argue that it is inherently unfair because it penalizes people who can afford healthcare because others cannot. So the question we should be asking is not about whether or not the government should be involved in healthcare. Such a question is aesthetic not economical; it is based on preference not on efficiency. Instead we should ask what way of organizing the system is the most efficient. How can we, as a society, pay for the medical care of people who cannot afford it themselves in the most efficient way possible?

Unfortunately, such a discussion is difficult to have. The fire-branding rhetoric of the right will accuse any government intervention in the world of healthcare as being a foray into the experiments of socialized medicine. But the current system is broken. The US ranks below Chile, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Dominica, Costa Rica, and Cyprus (among many others), in the WHO's ranking of healthcare by country. Nevertheless, the US total expenditure on healthcare per capita is almost double that of all of the other nations of the OECD, and even its public expenditure ranks among the top two or three nations in a system that is almost entirely private.

We must fix our way of providing healthcare for our society. It is inefficient and weighs down business and government. The debate should not be decided by the means to make the system more efficient, but rather by which method makes the system most efficient.